Danijela Dolenec

While Bologna reforms might not have been the cause of underfunding in higher education or of the disregard for wider social implications of massification in higher education, it has done very little in alleviating these problems. A brief look at the process has shown it to be driven primarily by the concerns which revolve around competitiveness on the global market, which is why most progress is reported in the area of structural and administrative reform. The real substantive reforms, which should lead to improved quality and academic mobility, have not been tackled in many countries

On March 12, 2010 the ministers of 47 signatory countries to the Bologna Declaration met in Vienna and signed the Budapest-Vienna Declaration, officially launching the European Higher Education Area (EHEA)[1]. At the same time, protesters gathered in front of the University of Vienna, exclaiming ‘Make Bologna History!’[2] These days Bologna seems to be on everybody’s lips, featuring as the favourite culprit. Students are protesting against Bologna reforms, university staff is complaining about bureaucratization, and prominent European intellectuals like Konrad Liessmann[3] are blaming Bologna for various ills plaguing university education today.

While there is much to criticise in the implementation of Bologna reforms, it is hardly likely that Bologna is to blame for decreased funding in higher education, introduction of tuition fees, imposed ‘dictate from Brussels’, turning of university education into a tradable good on the global service market, deterioration of quality in higher education, increase of government regulation and so and so forth. It seems important to disentangle from this long list of grievances those intents and effects that are brought about by Bologna reforms, singling them out from concurrent trends shaping higher education today.

In this brief analysis I enquire into how much Bologna is to blame for the current commercialisation of higher education, and I deal with the related issue of the relationship between the Bologna process and the EU. The analysis provides a critical assessment of Bologna reforms at the moment when EHEA has become reality - at least as a political statement, and it draws attention to failings in advancing the social dimension of educational reforms.

What is actually ‘Bologna’?

At the mentioned protest that took place in Vienna a few weeks back, the rector of the University of Vienna told the media that the issues students are angry about ‘have nothing to do with Bologna’ since the real problem that is behind their dissatisfaction is the underfinancing of higher education[4]. At the same meeting, ESIB chairperson Ms Deca said that ‘in some national contexts, tuition fees have been implemented or student participation has been reduced under the pretext of the Bologna Process. Consequently there is great confusion over what is actually ‘Bologna’.[5]

The commercialisation of higher education in Europe started before the Bologna reform was introduced. Higher education systems in Europe expanded dramatically in the period between 1960s and 1990s, a trend which has been described as the ‘massification’ of higher education. It represents, according to Theisens[6], one of the most profound developments in higher education ever. In 1970, the total number of students globally was 28.6 million, while in 2007 it was 152,5 million[7].

In addition, the number grew by 50% between 2000 and 2007. While in absolute terms European governments’ spending on higher education grew during the 1980s and 1990s, in terms of relative spending per student the amount of funding shrunk[8]. At the same time an important shift in economic paradigms was happening, where changes in the philosophy regarding higher education funding (primarily the policy pro- student tuition fees) were part of a broader intellectual attack on the welfare state[9]. However, this shift that happened in European policy on higher education funding predates the Bologna reform by at least a decade.

If we look at trends over time for Croatia since the beginning of 1990s, we see the same thing. Between 1990/91 and 2007/08 the number of students in Croatia rose 95%[10]. In the period since 1994 the growth in the number of students was exclusively based on the increase in the number of tuition fee-paying students. In 2001, when Croatia signed the Bologna Declaration, already around 50% of students were paying tuition fees[11].

In other words, it has already been well documented that in Croatia, like in the rest of Europe, the trend of commercialisation in higher education pre-dates the Bologna process. The process of reform probably exacerbated problems that were already there by putting increased pressures both on students and teachers in a system that has long been underfunded. It was the combination of ambitious reform objectives with lack of ambition in financing them that culminated in widespread dissatisfaction among university students and staff in Croatia and around Europe in 2009.

Reform is still needed today?

What does the European Union have to do with Bologna? The involvement of the EU with higher education policy starts with the introduction of the Erasmus programme, which was launched in 1987[12]. Since the launch of the Erasmus programme 1.2 million students have taken part in a study period abroad. According to Anne Corbett, a higher education policy expert from the LSE, already in the 1980s in the Commission’s thinking about education policy was explicitly linked to economic outcomes and the expansion of the four freedoms underpinning the single market programme.

In addition to that, education was seen as an ‘ideological tool’ for fostering a positive image of the European Community project[13]. Therefore, soon after in 1999 the Bologna Declaration was signed, the European Commission saw opportunities for synergies – primarily with its Lisbon Agenda[14]. In March 2000 EU heads of state had agreed on a set of policies that were to propel Europe towards becoming "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world ". Higher education played an important part in that development framework, according to which economies of the 21st century are premised on knowledge, research and development of new technologies.

With the Lisbon Agenda in mind, the European Commission became a participant in the Bologna process in 2001. It pushed for issues of qualification recognition and mobility, both of which are important for implementing the freedom of movement within the internal market. Currently the Commission website on the issue of the Bologna reform states that ‘reform is still needed today if Europe is to match the performance of the best performing systems in the world, notably the United States and Asia.’[15]

However, while preoccupation with global competitiveness of the European higher education system is most evident in the case of the European Commission, it would be wrong to assume that, had it not been for the policy entrepreneurship of the EC, Bologna reforms might have gone an entirely different way. The signing of the Bologna declaration was preceded by another international agreement, the Sorbonne Declaration from 1998.

This agreement was the initiative of the four big states – France, Germany, Italy and the UK – which likewise formulated the goal of making European higher education develop features which were seen as making the US system of higher education superior[16]. In other words, from the very start the Bologna reform was propelled by the concern that European universities are losing out in the global competition, both to the old-time rival the US, but increasingly also to other regions of the world like Asia. Therefore, to a large extent the European story of Bologna has been revolving around competitiveness and markets, and around advocating and extending the economic paradigm in discussing higher education and its goals.

At the same time, Bologna is a voluntary coordination process taking place between participating countries on the European level. It is marked by political commitments of education ministers from 47 states, whose implementation is entirely in the remit of national efforts. The fact that certain countries, like Croatia, decided to legislate Bologna reform objectives and that way make their implementation obligatory is entirely due to political decisions at the national level – there has been no such requirement from the European level.

While the European Commission funds the Erasmus programme and other educational programmes, it does not in any direct way condition either member states or countries aspiring to membership regarding the implementation of Bologna reforms. The fact that some countries decided to legislate parts of the Bologna reform, and later accuse the EU for the downsides of the process is simply an instance of blame-shifting, a much used and ever-successful game played for domestic political benefits.

Furthermore, in the Bologna coordination process, the European Commission is only one (albeit mighty) participant among 47 national delegations and several European-level stakeholders - such as the European University Association, representing the interests of universities, and – European Students’ Union[17], representing student voices. The two mentioned stakeholders have from the start of the process advanced alternative views of what Bologna should (also) be about.

Most importantly, they have been stressing the importance of the social mission of universities, as well as expressing hostility to treating education as a commodity. In part thanks to the efforts of these stakeholders, the social dimension was introduced into the Bologna process in 2001, for the first time formally mentioned in the Prague Communique[18].

After the Prague meeting, the importance of the social dimension to Bologna reforms was reiterated at all subsequent ministerial meetings. The official documents define the social dimension as the aim of ensuring equal access to studies, as well as ensuring equality of chances in progress and completion of studies[19].

Lack of social dimension

However, according to a survey ESIB conducted among students in Bologna participating countries, the ‘most commonly overlooked action line is the one relating to the social dimension’[20]. According to them, even though the social dimension of the Bologna Process is crucial if the vision of the EHEA is ever to be realised, only one third of national unions of students feel that it is a political priority for their government.

Further on, students continue to report widespread discrimination of those from a low socio-economic background, as well as those with children, students with disabilities and those with a job. Student debt, meanwhile, continues to increase as fees, study and living costs more generally continue to rise at a pace that far outstrips what the provision of loans and grants is available to cover.

Looking overall at how Bologna reforms have been implemented in the period 1999- 2010, the most recent Eurydice report[21], issued for the Vienna meeting, states that most progress has been made in harmonization of degree structures, introduction of ECTS and diploma supplements. Less has been done in areas of quality assurance and qualification recognition, while least has been achieved in the areas of mobility and the social dimension of the Bologna process.

Coming back to the beginning and the question of how Bologna is related to commercialisation, a look at these findings and the previous discussion bear evidence to the conclusion that, while Bologna reforms might not have been the cause of underfunding in higher education or of the disregard for wider social implications of massification in higher education, it has done very little in alleviating these problems.

A brief look at the process has shown it to be driven primarily by the concerns which revolve around competitiveness on the global market, which is why most progress is reported in the area of structural and administrative reform. The real substantive reforms, which should lead to improved quality and academic mobility, have not been tackled in many countries.

The Unesco Chair for Governance and Management in Higher Education at the University of Zagreb recently held a round table on the ‘current losses and future gains’ of the Bologna process[22]. There the dominant mood was one of dissatisfaction with how the reform has been implemented in Croatia. Anne Corbett has written that in situations where there is no binding law, implementation is a process of interpretation[23]; well, to rephrase some of the statements at this round table I would say that, at least in Croatia, in situations where there is binding law, implementation is a process of sabotage.

The reform process in Croatia has largely been perceived not as an opportunity but as an imposition. The findings of the Eurydice report show, in between the lines, some of the same failures on the European level: structural reform has been advanced, but in order for substantive reform to take place more intense involvement of key stakeholders – teachers and students – is necessary. Only then will the real issues of relevance for European universities - quality assurance, equity in education and academic mobility - be tackled.